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Abstract 
Inflation targeting is a monetary policy framework which was adopted by several emerging 
countries over the last decade. Previous empirical studies suggest that inflation targeting has 
significant effects on either inflation or inflation variability in emerging targeting countries. 
But, by reinforcing the disinflation process and so, by reducing drastically seigniorage 
revenue, the adoption of this monetary policy framework could also affect the design of fiscal 
policy. In a recent paper, Minea and Villieu (2009a) show theoretically that inflation targeting 
provides an incentive for governments to improve institutional quality in order to enhance tax 
revenue performance. In this paper, we test this theoretical prediction by investigating 
whether the adoption of inflation targeting affects the fiscal effort in emerging markets 
economies. Using propensity score matching methodology, we evaluate the “treatment effect” 
of inflation targeting on fiscal mobilization in thirteen emerging countries that have adopted 
this monetary policy framework by the end of 2004. Our results show that, on average, 
inflation targeting has a significant positive effect on public revenue collection. 
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1. Introduction 
Since its adoption by Chile in 1990, the monetary policy framework known as inflation 
targeting (hereafter IT) have been implemented by an increasing number of other emerging 
countries. Thus, by the end of 2009, there were nineteen emerging market economies which 
have adopted this monetary policy strategy, predominantly Latin American and Central and 
Eastern European countries. Moreover, beside these countries, several other emerging 
countries have expressed the wish to switch to IT at short-medium term
2
.  
According to Amato and Gerlach (2002), this evolution of monetary policy constitutes the 
most important change in the framework of monetary policy since the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system. Two main arguments can be advanced to explain the high popularity of IT in 
emerging economies. First, the choice of IT constitutes a pragmatic response to difficulties of 
central banks in conducting their monetary policy using an exchange rate peg or monetary 
aggregate as an intermediate target. Second, this choice can be explained by the relative 
benefits of this monetary policy framework on economic performances observed in 
industrialized and emerging economies that have adopted IT, and corroborated by a 
significant body of empirical literature. For instance, Lin and Ye (2009) find evidence for a 
large sample of developing and emerging countries that IT improves economic performance 
as measured by the level and variability inflation
3
. 
IT is defined as a framework for monetary policy characterized by the public announcement 
of official quantitative targets and by a commitment that low and stable inflation is the 
primary long-run goal of monetary policy (Bernanke et al., 1999). More precisely, Mishkin 
(2000) lists five components to an IT framework: (i) a public announcement of a medium-
term numerical inflation target; (ii) an institutional commitment to price stability as the 
primary monetary policy objective; (iii) an information-inclusive strategy to set monetary 
policy instruments; (iv) an increased level of transparency for the conduct of monetary policy; 
(v) and, an increased accountability of central bank for attaining its inflation objectives. Thus, 
this monetary policy strategy requires much more than a public announcement of numerical 
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 These countries are: Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Georgia, Honduras, 
Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Mauritius, Mongolia, Russia, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Uganda, and 
Venezuela (Pétursson, 2004). 
3
 Note however that Brito and Bystedt (2010) find no evidence that IT improves economic performances in 
emerging countries. 
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inflation targets. The main advantage of an IT framework is the increase of monetary policy 
discipline, transparency and coherence (Bernanke et al., 1999; Faust and Henderson, 2004). 
Furthermore, according to Bernanke et al. (1999), IT offers a framework of “constrained 
discretion” where the official target imposes the constraint, and the discretion is the scope for 
monetary authorities to take into account short-term disturbances to output or financial 
stability. This flexibility in the conduct of monetary policy is particularly important for 
emerging economies that are often adversely affected by external shocks (Fraga et al., 2003). 
These considerations suggest therefore that the success and the sustainability over the medium 
term of IT entail the fulfillment of several economic and institutional conditions. The 
literature has identified some preconditions that countries should theoretically satisfy before 
adopting IT
4
. However, the experience of emerging countries shows that the non fulfillment is 
not in itself an impediment to the adoption and success of this monetary policy framework. 
This emphasizes especially that the implementation of IT is a gradual process with economic 
and institutional reforms before and after the official adoption of this monetary policy 
framework. Indeed, as illustrated in Batini and Laxton (2006), we observed in some emerging 
countries that the adoption of IT has been associated with rapid improvements in institutional 
and technical structures. 
Besides these post-IT technical and institutional changes, we think that the adoption of IT by 
emerging market economies could also affect the design of fiscal policy, and more 
particularly the design of tax policy. Indeed, by strengthening the central bank independence 
and by giving the monetary authority a clear mandate for low inflation, the IT regime deprives 
the government of seigniorage revenue which is an important source of public revenue in 
developing and emerging countries. Consequently, we can expect that the government will 
attempt to enhance its tax revenue collection in order to recoup the loss of inflation tax 
revenue. In a recent paper, Minea and Villieu (2009a) address this question and show 
theoretically that a tighter monetary policy, i.e. a low inflation target, encourages the 
government to enhance the performance of tax administration. 
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 These preconditions have been especially underlined in the literature on IT in emerging market economies, 
such as Masson et al. (1997), Mishkin (2000), Amato and Gerlach (2002), and Carare et al. (2002). These 
requirements include in particular an independent, transparent and accountable central bank with a clear price 
stability mandate, a sound fiscal policy, a well-developed financial market, a flexible exchange rate regime, 
relatively low inflation rates, and well-developed statistic and econometric models to understand monetary 
policy transmission mechanisms and to forecast inflation. 
 
4 
 
Therefore, the aim of this paper is to empirically test this theoretical prediction by 
investigating whether the adoption of IT has encouraged the governments of emerging 
countries to raise domestic tax revenue. To the best of our knowledge, no previous empirical 
study has been conducted this question.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the channels through 
which IT could affect tax policy in emerging economies. The econometric model and the data 
are described in section 3, while our empirical results are discussed in section 4. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. Inflation targeting and tax policy in emerging economies 
There exists a voluminous theoretical literature on the interaction of monetary and fiscal 
policies. This literature suggests in particular that the delegation of monetary policy to an 
independent and more conservative central bank should affect the design of fiscal policy (see 
e.g., Masciandaro and Tabellini, 1987; Castellani and Debrun, 2001; Montiel, 2003). Indeed, 
the establishment of an independent monetary authority with a clear mandate for price 
stability deprives the government of future inflation tax revenue and so, induces it to a greater 
fiscal discipline. This is particularly true for developing and emerging countries, where 
seigniorage represents an important source of revenue for governments (World Economic 
Outlook, 2001). Using a dataset covering a large sample of developing countries, Lucotte 
(2009) finds relatively robust evidence for the negative relationship between central bank 
independence and budget deficits predicted by the theory. Furthermore, by giving the 
monetary authority a legislated objective of price stability, Gerlach (1999) argues that IT can 
be viewed as a substitute for central bank autonomy. Accordingly, under an IT framework, 
seigniorage is constrained through a visible “rule”, and the government is induced to conduct 
a more responsible fiscal policy.  
Concretely, to reduce its fiscal deficit, a budgetary authority has two complementary options: 
restrain its spending or/and increase its revenue. On the expenditure side, the government can 
undertake measures to reduce its structural spending and improve allocative efficiency of 
public expenditure. In emerging markets, over the last two decades, a common measure to 
consolidate fiscal accounts consisted of privatizing or reforming state-owned firms (Montiel, 
2003). On the revenue side, the government can implement reforms to enhance the 
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performance of tax administration, i.e. its capability to impose and collect taxes efficiently. 
Thus, the implementation of such tax reforms is likely to generate more revenues at a given 
level of economic activity and so, allows to recoup the substantial loss of seigniorage revenue 
due to a tighter monetary policy.    
Following this logic, Minea and Villieu (2009a) show theoretically that a tighter monetary 
policy should induce the government to improve institutional quality in order to limit the 
erosion of tax revenue
5
. Extending the model developed by Huang and Wei (2006) by 
modifying the principal-agent setup and by incorporating an indicator of financial 
development and a social welfare function, they conclude that, conditionally to the cost of 
institutional reforms
6
, pursue a low inflation target encourages the government to increase the 
performance of its tax collection system. Therefore, the adoption of IT in emerging countries 
is expected to exert a positive effect on tax revenue collection. 
More precisely, Minea and Villieu (2009a) consider a model in which the government, to 
finance public expenditures, has two sources of revenue: taxes on output and an inflation tax 
(i.e. seigniorage). In addition, the authors introduce in the government budget constraint two 
kinds of revenue leakage: a leakage in tax revenue captured by the degree of institutional 
quality and, a leakage in seigniorage revenue captured by the degree of development of the 
financial sector. Indeed, according to their specification, countries with poor institutional 
quality are not able to establish effective tax systems and so, these economies are 
characterized by a persistent weakness in tax collection. Inversely, countries with a sound tax 
administration exploit their tax base more fully, and the leakage of tax revenue is weak. 
Concerning the leakage in seigniorage revenue, the authors introduce in the model an 
indicator of financial development to capture the fact the banking system’s share of 
seigniorage revenue relative to that of the central bank increases with the level of financial 
development.  In other words, the higher the degree of financial development is, the lower the 
seigniorage revenue as a source of government finance is
7
. Therefore, in line with Cukierman 
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 The literature identifies many causes of poor tax administration in developing countries. These causes are 
principally: (i) a high level of taxpayers’ noncompliance and tax evasion because the tax system is perceived as 
unfair, and there is a lack of transparency in the use of public funds; (ii) a high corruption in the tax 
administration due to low wages in the public sector compared to the private sector, and a low probability of 
detection and punishment for corruption; and, (iii) a large informal sector. 
6
 According to Huang and Wei (2006, p. 248), “the cost could be in the form of a loss of economic rents that 
officials enjoy, or a stiffened resistance from powerful special interest groups that have been benefiting from 
corruption and lost tax revenue”. 
7
 See notably Minea and Villieu (2009b) and Ehrhart et al. (2009) for most details concerning this assumption. 
Moreover, note that dollarization implies also a loss of seigniorage revenue for the government. Nonetheless, 
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et al. (1992), Minea and Villieu (2009a) conjecture that economies characterized by weak tax 
administrations and low developed financial markets will use extensively seigniorage as a 
source of government revenue rather than “conventional” tax. Moreover, as Huang and Wei 
(2006), their model considers a two-step game with three agents: the central bank, the fiscal 
authority, and a “supra-authority” (i.e. the society). The sequence of actions is nonetheless 
reversed, and the timing of the model is as follows: in the first step, the “supra-authority” 
(acting as the principal) chooses the “monetary regime” in order to maximize the social 
welfare function; in the second step, the central bank (the agent) chooses the inflation rate and 
the government the tax rate and the level of effort in enhancing the quality of institutions that 
maximize the government’s objective function. More precisely, in the case of IT framework, 
the supra-authority sets the inflation target that the monetary authority must fulfill. 
The model developed by Minea and Villieu (2009a) exhibits two interesting results. First, by 
finding an inverse relationship between the level of effort and the inflation target, the authors 
show that the lower the inflation target is, the higher the government’s effort in enhancing the 
quality of its institutions will be. In other words, by setting a lower inflation target, the “supra-
authority” encourages the fiscal authority to intensify its efforts to implement a more efficient 
tax-collecting administration in order to recoup the loss of seigniorage revenue due to a 
tighter monetary policy. Therefore, this result joins theoretical and empirical arguments 
presented above that conclude that a greater degree of central bank independence may 
influence the government to fiscal discipline. Nonetheless, this effort in strengthening 
institutional quality will depend on the cost bearing by the government. To take into account 
this coast, the authors define corner solutions and show that the values of thresholds depend 
on the monetary policy, and more precisely on the level of inflation target. Effectively, a 
decrease in the inflation target reduces the interval in which government’s effort is minimal 
and increases the interval in which the effort in improving institutional quality is maximal. 
To conclude, it is important to note that the incentive of the government to improve the 
collection of tax revenue could be nonetheless diminished by a significant decrease of 
inflation rate. Indeed, empirical literature has provided evidence that tax revenue is negatively 
affected by inflation, the so-called Olivera-Tanzi effect (Tanzi, 1992). This inverse 
relationship is usually explained by the fact that the real value of tax revenue is eroded by 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
according to Armas and Grippa (2006), Peru is the only highly financially dollarized economy that has adopted 
IT. 
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inflation, since it exists for some tax categories a time-lag between the date of imposition and 
the effective collection of these taxes
8
. Therefore, by theoretically maintaining inflation at low 
levels, and therefore by increasing the real value of tax revenue, IT may attenuate the 
government’s tax collection effort. However, in the greatest number of emerging economies, 
IT was adopted after a disinflation process. So, we expect that this inverse Olivera-Tanzi 
effect is relatively marginal in these countries. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
To investigate whether the adoption of IT encourages the government to increase domestic tax 
revenue, we implement the propensity score matching (hereafter PSM) methodology 
developed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and Heckman et al. (1998). This method is 
becoming increasingly popular in microeconometrics in order to assess the performance of 
development programs, such as school or health programs. Although still little used in 
macroeconomic studies, the PSM approach has nevertheless been recently used by Vega and 
Winkelried (2005) and Lin and Ye (2007, 2009) to assess the impact of IT adoption on the 
level and variability of inflation in developed and emerging economies.  
Our panel dataset consists of thirty emerging market countries, inflation targeters and non-
inflation targeters, over the period of 1980-2004
9
. The data are drawn from various sources, 
including in particular the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2008. 
 
3.1. Data
10
 
Independent variable and sample countries. The independent variable of interest is a binary 
variable taking the value 1 if a country operates with an IT framework at the year t, and 0 
otherwise. In this paper, we adopt the classification of IT countries proposed by Levya (2008), 
which tabulates two IT adoption dates for each country having adopted this monetary policy 
framework: one corresponding to a partial adoption (IT_PA) and the second to a fully-fledged 
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 However, note that the Olivera-Tanzi effect was mainly observed in hyperinflation countries. 
9
 The data are not available for all countries on the whole period, so we use an unbalanced panel data. The list of 
countries that constitute our sample is given in Table 1.  
10
 See Appendix A for variables definitions and sources. 
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adoption (IT_FF)
11
. According to this classification, our sample of IT emerging economies is 
composed of Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Israel, Mexico, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, South Africa, South Korea and Thailand. Concerning the control group, 
i.e. the non-IT countries, we consult the Standard & Poor’s Emerging Market Index, the 
Morgan Stanley Capital International Emerging Market Index, and the IMF’s International 
Capital Markets Department’s list of emerging markets. Following Joyce and Nabar (2009), 
we consider the countries which appear on at least two of these three lists
12
. Table 1 lists the 
thirteen targeting and the seventeen non targeting countries, and the years in which IT 
countries have adopted this monetary policy framework. 
Table 1: Samples countries and dates of IT adoption 
Inflation targeting countries 
 
Partial adoption Fully-fledged adoption 
Brazil 1999 1999 
Chile 1991 2000 
Colombia 2000 2000 
Czech Republic 1998 1998 
Hungary 2001 2001 
Israel 1992 1997 
Mexico 1995 2001 
Peru 1994 2002 
Philippines 2002 2002 
Poland 1999 1999 
South Africa 2000 2000 
South Korea 1998 1998 
Thailand 2000 2000 
Non-inflation targeting countries 
Argentina Jordan Slovak Republic 
China Malaysia Sri Lanka 
Egypt  Morocco Turkey  
Guatemala Pakistan Venezuela 
India Romania Zimbabwe 
Indonesia Russia   
 
As shown in Table 1, four countries (Chile, Israel, Mexico, and Peru) started using a partial IT 
framework before switching to a full-fledged IT. In fact, during this transition period, central 
banks of these countries have maintained an additional nominal anchor for monetary policy 
(typically an exchange rate band). Moreover, according to Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel 
(2007), a partial IT is also characterized by the non-fulfillment of key preconditions for IT 
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 Levya (2008) adopt the “half-year rule”: if IT is adopted in the second half of any year t, the year t+1 is 
considered as the adoption year. 
12
 We also include in the sample of non-IT countries Guatemala and Romania, which have adopted IT in 2005.   
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and the non-establishment of operational features of IT (such as publishing inflation reports 
that contain inflation projections). 
Dependent variable. The endogenous variable considered in our study is the total public 
revenue (excluding grants) as share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) compiled by the Center 
for Studies and Research on International Development on the base of International Financial 
Statistics (IFS) and Government Finance Statistics (GFS) databases, and national statistics. 
Although most studies use tax revenue, we measure taxation revenue as total public revenue 
(TAX_REV). Three arguments can be advanced to explain our choice. First, availability of 
relevant data on domestic tax revenue for developing and emerging countries is relatively 
limited. Second, in developing and emerging economies, public revenue is principally 
composed of direct taxes (taxes on income and profit) and indirect taxes (taxes on 
international trade and domestic taxes on consumption – sales tax, Value-Added tax and 
excise tax), while non-tax revenue
13
 represents a small part of the public revenue. Third, total 
public revenue is less sensitive to the substitution effect between the different components of 
public revenue, i.e. tax revenue and non-tax revenue (Chambas, 2005).  
Figure 1a presents a comparison of average total public revenues between IT countries and 
non-IT countries over different time periods, while figure 1b presents a comparison of 
average total public revenues between pre and post-IT periods for inflation targeters. In figure 
1a, we compare firstly average total public revenue in IT and non-IT economies on the overall 
period (1980-2004), while in specifications (2) and (3) we follow Ball and Sheridan (2003) 
suggestion to make a comparison between inflation and non-inflation targeters after the 
adoption (partial and fully-fledged respectively) of this monetary policy framework
14
. The 
two specifications in figure 1b correspond to a comparison of average public revenue between 
pre and post-IT periods, respectively in the case of a partial adoption (IT_PA) and a fully-
fledged adoption (IT_FF). Two preliminary results emerge from figures 1a and 1b. First, on 
average, IT countries have higher levels of public revenue than non-IT economies. Second, in 
IT countries, average total public revenue tends to increase after the adoption of IT, especially 
when we consider the fully-fledged adoption date. Hence, this latter result seems to indicate 
that IT countries have intensified their efforts to collect more public revenue after the 
implementation of IT. 
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 The non-tax revenues include in particular social security contributions, dividends from state firms, rents from 
government property, fines, penalties, and sales of goods and services.  
14
 Ball and Sheridan (2003) suggest to take as the “year of adoption” for non-targeters the mean of the adoption 
dates in the targeters group. This date is so the same for all non-IT countries, respectively 1998 if we consider 
partial adoption (specification 2) and 2000 in the case of fully-fledged adoption (specification 3).  
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Figure 1a: Average total public revenue (% of GDP): IT vs. Non-IT countries 
 
 
Figure 1b: Average total public revenue (% of GDP): pre-IT vs. post-IT periods 
 
 
Finally, the other variables of the model are variables that could explain the probability that 
an emerging country adopts an IT framework. Following Lin and Ye (2009) and the empirical 
literature devoted to the determinants driving the choice of IT
15
, we choose the following 
seven variables: the lagged inflation rate (CPI_1), the five-year central bank governors 
turnover rate (TOR_5), the real per capita GDP growth (GDPPCG), the domestic credit to 
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 See Pétursson (2004) for a detailed survey of empirical literature. 
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private sector to GDP (PCRED), the de facto exchange rate regime (EXCH), the trade 
openness (OPEN), and the number of countries (industrialized and emerging) that have 
adopted IT at the year t (NUM_IT). We expect the first two variables to be negatively 
correlated with the likelihood of adopting IT, while the other covariates are expected to have a 
positive effect on this probability. 
 
3.2. Econometric methodology 
The main challenge of our econometric analysis is to deal with the nature of the independent 
variable. Indeed, as specified above, the independent variable of interest is binary, and takes 
the value 1 if a country pursues an IT policy at the year t and 0 otherwise. In the case of our 
study, the difficulty of evaluating the impact of IT adoption on domestic tax revenue resides 
in the fact that we cannot observe what would have been this revenue if an inflation targeter 
has made the choice to not adopt this monetary policy framework. Conversely, it is 
impossible to observe what would have been domestic tax revenue if a non-inflation targeter 
has switched to IT.  
A simple solution to assess this causal effect, by definition unobservable, would consist in 
comparing average public tax revenue of IT countries with those of a comparison group of 
countries which have not adopted IT (canonical model introduced by Rubin, 1974). In doing 
so, we suppose that our two groups of economies are very similar, such that countries which 
adopted IT would have had domestic tax revenue similar to those in the comparison group in 
the absence of IT. However, as we know, emerging countries constitute a relatively 
heterogeneous group. Thus, such a statistical approach raises the question of selection bias, 
which can lead to an overestimation of the impact of IT adoption on tax revenue
16
. 
In response to this selectivity bias problem, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) have developed the 
PSM methodology. This latter is a non experimental method which consists of matching 
treated observations with untreated observations on the basis of observed characteristics 
unaffected by the treatment. The average treatment effect is then calculated as the mean 
difference in outcomes across these two groups, i.e. treated and untreated. In our case, the 
“treatment” corresponds to the adoption of IT and the outcome is the domestic tax revenue. 
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 In theory, a selection bias can lead to an either underestimation or overestimation. Nonetheless, in our case 
study, an overestimation of the impact of IT adoption on domestic tax revenue could be expected since to adopt 
such a monetary policy framework, a country should theoretically fulfill several preconditions. One of them is a 
sound fiscal policy. So, we can expect that IT emerging countries are also those with a relatively developed tax 
administration. 
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Indeed, a country is considered as “treated” if it pursues an IT strategy at the year t, and as 
“untreated” if it not operates with this monetary policy framework at the same period. Finally, 
concerning the matching, it is conducted on a set of potential determinants associated with a 
country’s choice of IT. 
Therefore, the “average treatment effect on treated” (hereafter ATT) can be written as: 
    
         
                     
                                                                                     
where T is the independent variable corresponding to the adoption of IT and Y is the domestic 
tax revenue. Thus,    
        represents the domestic tax revenue observed in a country 
having adopting IT at the year t (T = 1) and    
        the domestic tax revenue observed in 
the counterfactual.        corresponds to the propensity score, i.e. the probability that 
conditionally to a set of observable covariates  , a country i adopts an IT framework at the 
period t. The propensity score is noted as:  
                                                                                                                                              
The propensity score is estimated using a binary outcome model (probit or logit) where     is 
a vector of variables corresponding to observed country’s characteristics theoretically 
associated with the choice of adopting IT. 
Nevertheless, the PSM approach provides a sound impact assessment only if two assumptions 
are satisfied. The first is the conditional independence assumption, which means that given a 
set of observed covariates   unaffected by the treatment, the potential outcomes   is 
independent of treatment assignment  . In other words, this means that the choice of adopting 
IT is independent of the potential outcomes in both situations, adoption or no adoption. 
Consequently, this implies that the choice of switching to an IT strategy is solely based on 
observable countries’ characteristics and not on unobservable characteristics. Furthermore, in 
practical terms, this assumption implies that we must observe and include in the vector   all 
variables that influence simultaneously treatment assignment and potential outcomes. 
Formally, this hypothesis can be written as: 
   
    
                                                                                                                                                   
As shown by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), the fulfillment of this assumption is fundamental 
since it allows to match observations on the basis of their propensity score        rather than 
13 
 
on the whole conditioning variables. The propensity score constitutes then a unidimensionnal 
“summary” of the covariates. According to Rubin (2007), the fact that the propensity score is 
independent of the potential outcomes constitutes the main advantage of matching estimators 
compared with other non experimental methodologies. 
The second assumption is the common support condition whose importance has been 
emphasized by Heckman et al. (1998, 1999). In the case of our study, this condition ensures 
that we can find for each IT country at the period t a counterfactual in the comparison group 
of non-IT economies, i.e. an observation with the same or nearby propensity score. Formally, 
the common support condition means that observations with the same   values have a 
positive probability of being treated or untreated. Thus, this condition can be written as:   
                                                                                                                                                      
This condition implies that the propensity score distribution is not very different in the 
treatment and the control group. Consequently, the common support condition rules out the 
phenomenon of perfect predictability of   given   (i.e. the perfect predictability of IT 
adoption) and so, paradoxically, implies that the binary outcome model must not be “too 
good” (Brodaty et al., 2007). 
By presenting in details the propensity score matching methodology and its relevance for our 
study, we have seen that the quality of impact analysis depends mainly on the “robustness” of 
propensity score estimates. Furthermore, the resulting estimate is also affected by the 
matching criterion used to assign treated and untreated on the basis of the propensity score. 
For this reason, most of papers use different matching algorithms to assess the effect of 
treatment
17
. In this paper, following Lin and Ye (2007, 2009), we use three PSM algorithms 
commonly used in the literature: 
(i) Nearest-neighbor matching estimator consists of matching each treated 
observation with an untreated observation that is the closest in terms of propensity 
score. We consider the one-to-one matching with no replacement (n = 1), the three 
nearest-neighbor matching (n = 3), and the five nearest-neighbor matching (n = 5); 
(ii) Radius matching estimator imposes a threshold on the maximum propensity score 
distance. We consider three calipers, i.e. three values for maximum distance of 
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 See notably Caliendo and Kopeinig (2007) and Khandker et al. (2010) for detailed discussions concerning 
these algorithms. 
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untreated observations: a wide radius (r = 0.04), a medium radius (r = 0.02), and 
tight radius (r = 0.01); 
(iii) Kernel matching estimator proposed by Heckman et al. (1998) consists of using a 
weighted average of all untreated observations to construct the counterfactual 
match for each treated observation. The weight given to each untreated 
observation depends on the distance from the treated observation in terms of 
propensity score. Logically, this weight increases with the convergence in terms of 
propensity score of untreated observations to the considered treated observation
18
.  
 
4. Results 
As implicitly shown in the previous section, the estimation process of the average treatment 
effect of IT on the level of domestic tax revenue includes two steps. The first step consists of 
estimating the propensity scores with a binary outcome model, while the second step consists 
of matching treated and untreated observations to estimate the average treatment effect on the 
treated.  
4.1. Estimating the propensity scores 
To estimate the propensity scores, we use a probit model. The dependent variable is the IT 
variable. The results are reported in table 2, in which we distinguish the partial adoption and 
the fully-fledged adoption of IT. All significant estimated coefficients have the expected 
signs. We find that the real per capita GDP growth, the de facto exchange rate flexibility, and 
the number of inflation targeters in the world are positively associated with a greater 
likelihood of adopting IT, while the turnover rate of central bank governors and the lagged 
inflation rate are significantly and negatively related with this probability. Concerning the 
coefficients of domestic credit to private sector and trade openness, they are not statistically 
significant. The pseudo-R
2 
is 0.42 and 0.66 in the case of partial adoption and fully-fledged 
adoption, respectively. 
                                                          
18
 The weights for kernel matching are given by:       
  
     
  
 
   
     
  
 
 , where Pi is the propensity score for treated 
observation i, Pj  is the propensity score for untreated observation  j, K(.) is a kernel function, and an is a 
bandwidth parameter. 
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Table 2: Probit estimates of propensity scores 
 
IT (partial adoption) IT (fully-fledged adoption) 
 
(1) (2) 
GDPPCG 0.054** 0.061* 
 
(0.02) (0.03) 
CPI_1 -0.045*** 0.158*** 
 
(0.01) (0.03) 
PCRED -0.00 -0.003 
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
TOR_5 -0.468 -2.399*** 
 
(0.48) (0.82) 
EXCH 0.289*** 0.475*** 
 
(0.03) (0.06) 
OPEN -0.003 0.003 
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
NUM_IT 0.091*** 0.188*** 
 
(0.01) (0.03) 
Nb. of observations 515 515 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.42 0.66 
Note: Constant terms are included but not reported. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** refer 
to statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
4.2. Results from matching 
Before turning to the matching estimates
19
, we implement the common support condition 
which ensures that treated and untreated observations share the same support. In this paper, 
we use the methodology suggested by Dehejia and Wahba (1999) which consists of dropping 
treated observations whose the propensity score is higher than the maximum or smaller than 
the minimum in the control group. The estimated ATTs on the level of public revenue are 
reported in table 3. The first three columns show the results from nearest-neighbor matching, 
the columns (4) (5) and (6) report the results from radius matching, and the last column 
presents the result from kernel matching. The estimated ATTs are all found to be positive and 
statistically significant. This suggests that, on average, IT has a quantitatively large and 
statistically significant impact on increasing public revenue in emerging market economies. 
This result largely supports our hypothesis that the adoption of IT may encourage the 
government to improve the collection of tax revenue. In particular, as shown in figure 1, the 
results indicate that the average estimated ATT is larger when we consider the fully-fledged 
adoption of IT than partial adoption. The average estimated ATT on the level of public 
                                                          
19
 Matching estimates are obtained using the Stata module PSMATCH2 developed by Leuven and Sianesi 
(2003). 
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revenue across different matching algorithms is about 4.45 in the case of partial adoption and 
is about 7.95 in the case of fully-fledged adoption. This latter result can nonetheless be 
explained by the fact that the modernization of tax and customs administrations requires deep 
reforms which, by definition, take time to produce revenue gains. 
Table 3: Matching estimates of treatment effect on the level of public revenue  
  Matching algorithms 
 
Nearest-neighbor 
matching Radius matching  
Kernel 
matching 
 
n = 1 n = 3 n = 5 r = 0.04 r = 0.02 r = 0.01 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Partial adoption 
Average Treatment on Treated (ATT) 3.15
**
 4.87
***
 4.90
***
 4.61
***
 4.41
***
 4.66
***
 4.57
***
 
 
(1.36) (1.52) (1.42) (1.42) (1.57) (1.76) (1.34) 
Nb. of treated observations on common support 98 98 98 98 85 77 98 
Nb. of treated observations off  common support 2 2 2 2 15 23 2 
  Fully-fledged adoption 
Average Treatment on Treated (ATT) 6.57
***
 7.94
***
 7.29
***
 8.35
***
 8.65
***
 8.52
**
 8.36
***
 
 
(1.73) (2.20) (2.05) (2.39) (2.59) (3.44) (2.19) 
Nb. of treated observations on common support 51 51 51 49 37 30 51 
Nb. of treated observations off common support 22 22 22 24 36 43 22 
Note: A 0.06 fixed bandwidth and an Epanechnikov kernel are used for kernel regression matching. 
Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses (1000 replications). *, **, *** refer to statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
4.3. Robustness checks 
We check the robustness of our empirical results in three ways. The first is to check whether 
our results are sensitive to alternative specifications of the probit model. More precisely, we 
introduce three variables that could simultaneously influence the choice of adopting IT and 
the level of domestic tax revenue. These variables are: the lagged domestic tax revenue 
(TAX_REV_1), the Polity2 index (POLITY2) developed by the Polity IV Project and, the 
government stability index (GSTAB) computed by the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG). The first variable is included to take into account a potential persistence of domestic 
tax revenue, while a well-developed tax administration is expected to have a positive effect on 
the probability of adopting IT regime. Indeed, as emphasized above, one of the preconditions 
for successful IT strategy is a sound fiscal policy, which requires a strengthening of tax 
administration system and improvements to expenditure control and debt management. 
Concerning the Polity2 index, it measures the “degree” of democratization in a country. It 
takes value from -10 (very autocratic) to +10 (very democratic) and is constructed by 
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subtracting the “democracy” score from the “autocracy” score20. This index, which can be 
viewed as an overall measure of political stability, is expected to be positively related with the 
likelihood of adopting IT. Moreover, as shown by Ehrhart (2009), it exists a positive 
relationship between the level of democracy and the domestic tax revenue in developing 
countries. Finally, we consider the government stability index, which assesses the 
government’s ability to carry out its declared program(s) and its ability to stay in office. This 
index takes values from 0 (very low stability) to 12 (very high stability). It is the sum of three 
subcomponents (government unity, legislative strength, and popular support), each with a 
maximum score of four points and a minimum score of zero point. Following Gupta (2007), 
we expect this variable to be positively with the public revenue since efficient reforms in tax 
administration and so, tax revenue performance, require a relative political stability. Hence, a 
positive relationship between these three covariates and the probability of adopting IT is 
expected. The new probit estimates of the propensity scores are presented in the first three 
columns of table 4. The estimated coefficients of lagged domestic tax revenue and Polity2 
index have the expected signs and are significant. Conversely, as can be seen in column (3) of 
table 3, the coefficient of the political stability index has the wrong sign but is not statistically 
significant. Concerning other covariates, the results are very similar to those reported in the 
table 2.  
Second, we want to check whether our results are robust to different sample periods. We then 
re-estimate the initial probit model by dropping the pre-1990 observations. Column (4) of 
table 3 reports the results from this probit regression. Our results do not change for the new 
sample period. The pseudo-R
2 
is 0.35 and 0.62 in the case of partial adoption and fully-
fledged adoption, respectively. 
Finally, we check the robustness of our results by dropping all hyperinflation periods (defined 
as an annual inflation rate ≥ 40%) since some countries of our sample have experienced 
hyperinflation
21
. Indeed, from an econometric point of view, these extreme values of inflation 
could bias the results of the probit model and, consequently, the matching estimates. The 
results from the probit regression are reported in column (5) of table 4. The results are very 
similar to those reported in the table 2. In particular, the estimated coefficient of inflation rate 
is still negative and significant at the 1% level.  
                                                          
20
 See the dataset users’ manual available at: http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2007.pdf for a detail 
description of this index. 
21
 See Appendix B for summary statistics of inflation rate in IT and non-IT countries. The number of dropped 
observations is 76. 
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The matching results based on these new propensity scores are presented in table 5. Most of 
the estimated ATTs remain positive and statistically significant, even if they are less or not 
significant when we add the lagged tax revenue and the Polity2 index to the baseline probit 
model than other specifications. As in table 3, the average estimated ATT is larger when we 
consider the fully-fledged adoption of IT than partial adoption. The average estimated ATT 
on the level of public revenue across different matching algorithms is about 3.46 in the case of 
partial adoption and is about 5.93 in the case of fully-fledged adoption. Thus, our empirical 
results are relatively robust to alternative specifications of probit model and confirm the 
empirical prediction of Minea and Villieu (2009a), in the sense that the adoption of IT has a 
significant positive impact on tax revenue collection. 
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Table 4: Probit estimates of propensity scores (robustness checks) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
  IT_PA IT_FF IT_PA IT_FF IT_PA IT_FF IT_PA IT_FF IT_PA IT_FF 
GDPPCG 0.052** 0.045 0.058** 0.017 0.053** 0.059* 0.054** 0.061* 0.047** 0.061* 
 
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
CPI_1 -0.043*** -0.173*** -0.048*** -0.163*** -0.045*** -0.153*** -0.049*** -0.158*** -0.049*** -0.158*** 
 
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) 
PCRED 0.001 -0.00 0.00 -0.005 0.00 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
TOR_5 -0.449 -2.446*** -1.011* -3.181*** -0.541 -2.59*** -0.40 -2.404*** -0.664 -2.399*** 
 
(0.49) (0.88) (0.54) (1.01) (0.50) (0.84) (0.51) (0.82) (0.51) (0.82) 
EXCH 0.274*** 0.468*** 0.245*** 0.429*** 0.281*** 0.456*** 0.296*** 0.475*** 0.306*** 0.475*** 
 
(0.03) (0.07) (0.04) (0.09) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) 
OPEN  -0.006** -0.004 -0.006** -0.002 -0.003 0.003 -0.003 0.003 -0.002 0 .003 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
NUM_IT 0.094*** 0.227*** 0.066*** 0.174*** 0.094*** 0.192*** 0.071*** 0.187*** 0.093*** 0.188*** 
 
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) 
TAX_REV_1 0.021** 0.066*** 
        
 
(0.01) (0.02) 
        POLITY2 
  
0.109*** 0.543*** 
      
   
(0.02) (0.17) 
      GSTAB 
    
-0.055 -0.125 
              (0.05) (0.08)     
  
Nb. of observations 501 501 515 515 473 473 396 396 439 439 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.43  0.70  0.48 0.74   0.40  0.65  0.35  0.62  0.41  0.64 
Note: Constant terms are included but not reported. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** refer to statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 5: Matching estimates of treatment effect on the level of public revenue (robustness checks) 
  Matching algorithms 
 
Nearest-neighbor matching Radius matching  
Kernel 
matching 
 
n = 1 n = 3 n = 5 r = 0.04 r = 0.02 r = 0.01 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Average Treatment on Treated (ATT) Partial adoption 
Adding lagged tax revenue 2.12** 1.04 1.03 1.28 0.22 0.16 1.43 
 
(0.91) (1.24) (1.09) (0.97) (1.22) (1.66) (0.93) 
Adding Polity2 3.03** 2.86* 2.62* 3.21** 3.14* 2.68 3.05** 
 
(1.51) (1.68) (1.50) (1.48) (1.71) (1.99) (1.43) 
Adding government stability 3.83*** 4.45*** 4.37*** 4.28*** 4.44*** 4.20** 4.40*** 
 
(1.40) (1.68) (1.44) (1.40) (1.49) (1.84) (1.38) 
Post 1990-sample 3.39** 4.95*** 4.76*** 5.15*** 5.31*** 4.41** 4.90*** 
 
(1.33) (1.56) (1.44) (1.46) (1.66) (1.84) (1.38) 
No hyperinflation periods 4.02*** 4.40*** 4.52*** 4.67*** 4.42*** 3.84** 4.72*** 
 
(1.33) (1.52) (1.47) (1.42) (1.63) (1.91) (1.35) 
  Fully-fledged adoption 
Average Treatment on Treated (ATT) 
       Adding lagged tax revenue 2.10 4.10** 4.01** 3.01 2.24 1.68 3.65** 
 
(1.59) (2.10) (1.94) (2.01) (2.60) (3.48) (1.82) 
Adding Polity2 4.15* 4.50* 4.10* 3.90 3.97 0.56 4.39* 
 
(2.17) (2.46) (2.37) (2.74) (3.33) (4.41) (2.58) 
Adding government stability 6.96*** 6.87*** 6.94*** 7.59*** 7.79*** 7.17** 7.66*** 
 
(1.71) (2.27) (2.18) (2.34) (2.79) (3.43) (2.16) 
Post 1990-sample 6.56*** 7.94*** 7.36*** 8.24*** 8.00*** 8.39** 8.33*** 
   (1.86)  (2.22)  (2.16)  (2.23)  (2.64)  (3.36)  (2.13) 
No hyperinflation periods 6.57*** 7.94*** 7.29*** 8.34*** 8.63*** 8.50*** 8.34*** 
 
(1.76) (2.18) (2.15) (2.25) (2.63) (3.31) (2.23) 
Note: A 0.06 fixed bandwidth and an Epanechnikov kernel are used for kernel regression matching. 
Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses (1000 replications). *, **, *** refer to statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Previous empirical studies focused on the impact of IT adoption on macroeconomic 
performances. In this paper, we attempt to assess whether the adoption of this monetary 
policy framework, by maintaining inflation at low levels, encourages the government to 
improve the collection of domestic tax revenue in order to recoup the loss of seigniorage 
revenue due to a tighter monetary policy. Using a propensity score matching approach, we 
find that most of the estimated ATTs on the level of total public revenue are positive, highly 
significant, and large in magnitude. Moreover, results are robust to different alternative 
specifications. Indeed, our empirical results show that, on average, the adoption of IT has led 
to an augmentation of public revenue collection in emerging market economies.     
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These empirical findings suggest therefore that the absence of fiscal dominance, i.e. a sound 
fiscal policy, is not a fundamental precondition for the adoption of IT, relative to other 
prerequisites such as central bank independence or the flexibility of the exchange regime. In 
other words, an unsound fiscal policy should not constitute an impediment to the adoption of 
IT by emerging economies, since this monetary policy framework may help constrain fiscal 
policy. The success and the sustainability over the medium term of IT will depend more on 
the ability of the authorities to plan and drive institutional reforms after adopting IT, in 
particular reforms aiming to modernize tax and customs administrations. 
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Appendix A. Variables definitions and sources 
 
Variables Definition and source 
EXCH 
De facto “fine” classification of exchange rate regimes: polytomic variable taking values from 1 (hard pegs) to 14 
(freely falling). Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2004; 2009 update). 
GDPPCG Real per capita GDP growth. Source: World Development Indicators (2008). 
GSTAB 
Government stability: variable assessing the government’s ability to carry out its declared program(s) and its ability 
to stay in office, and taking values from 0 (very low stability) to 12 (very high stability). This variable is the sum of 
three subcomponents (government unity, legislative strength, and popular support), each with a maximum score of 
four points and a minimum score of zero point. Source: International Country Risk Guide. 
IT 
Binary variable taking the value 1 if a country has in place an IT regime at the period  , and 0 otherwise. Source: 
Levya (2008) 
CPI_1 
One-year lagged inflation rate, measured by annual percentage change of consumer prices. Source: World 
Development Indicators (2008). 
NUM_IT 
Number of industrialized and emerging countries that have adopted IT at the period t. Source: Author’s calculations 
based on Levya (2008). 
OPEN 
Trade openness is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services as a share of GDP. Source: World 
Development Indicators (2008). 
PCRED 
Domestic credit provided by deposit money banks and other financial institutions as a percentage of GDP. Source: 
World Development Indicators (2008). 
POLITY2 
Index taking values from -10 (very autocratic) to +10 (very democratic) and constructed by subtracting the 
“democracy” score from the “autocracy” score. Source: ICRG. 
TAX_REV Total public revenue as a share of GDP. Source: Center for Studies and Research on International Development. 
TOR_5 
De facto central bank independence measured by the turnover rate of central bank governors based on 5-years 
averages. Source: Author’s calculations based on central bank websites and Dreher et al. (2008; april 2009 update).  
 
 
Appendix B. Summary Statistics 
 
Variables Obs. Missing obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
Inflation targeting countries (1980-2004) 
EXCH 307 18 10.07 3.12 2 14 
GDPPCG 303 22 1.96 4.18 -13.87 11.81 
GSTAB 264 61 7.12 1.97 1 11 
CPI 310 15 97.91 529.13 -0.41 7481.66 
OPEN 305 20 60.15 29.17 14.39 147.76 
PCRED 300 25 52.12 31.39 9.25 165.71 
POLITY2 312 13 5.12 5.45 -9 10 
TAX_REV 227 98 25.44 10.11 6.5 52.2 
TOR_5 325 0 0.27 0.26 0 1.2 
 
Non-inflation targeting countries (1980-2004) 
EXCH 397 28 8.49 3.82 2 14 
GDPPCG 409 16 1.99 5.05 -16.51 16.23 
GSTAB 340 85 7.41 2.24 1.83 12 
CPI 380 45 44.66 210.99 -1.41 3079.81 
OPEN 399 26 60.97 40.12 11.54 228.87 
PCRED 378 47 40.73 34.98 7.17 210.42 
POLITY2 400 25 0.96 6.59 -10 9 
TAX_REV 312 113 22.47 7.84 3.01 46.1 
TOR_5  405  20  0.27 0.25   0 1.2  
 
